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Innocence Lost:
Bennis v. Michigan and
the Forfeiture Tradition
Donald J. Boudreaux* & A.C. Pritchard"
There have been times-there still are countries and times, when and where
the rule, founded injustice and nature, that the property of the parent is the
inheritance of his children, has been intercepted in its benign operation by
the cruel interference of another rule, founded in tyranny and avarice-the
crimes of the subject are the inheritance of the prince. At those times, and
in those countries, an insult to society becomes a pecuniary favor to the
crown; the appointed guardian of the publick security becomes interested
in the violation of the law; and the hallowed ministers ofjustice become the
rapacious agents of the treasury.
James Wilson'
In Bennis v. Michigan, the Supreme Court upheld the State of Michigan's
forfeiture of Tina Bennis's joint ownership interest in a car used by her
husband for a tryst with a prostitute.2 Surveying its prior cases, the Court
found that Tina Bennis's innocence of the offending conduct was irrelevant
to the constitutionality of Michigan's forfeiture of her ownership interest. In
so finding, the Court relied on the tradition of forfeiture to affirm the
constitutionality of the "tyranny and avarice" condemned by James Wilson-a
leading framer of the Constitution.
The Anglo-American tradition of civil forfeiture, however, is considerably
narrower than the Court's account. The forfeiture known to the common law
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never would have reached the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture in Bennis.
The modem Court's careless reading of forfeiture tradition has allowed state
and federal governments to expand forfeiture well beyond its historical
boundaries. Consequently, forfeiture has come to be an instrument of
oppression that would have appalled Wilson and the rest of America's
founding generation. Even conceding civil forfeiture's current scope, the
relevant forfeiture tradition would have protected Tina Bennis's ownership
interest. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s familiar epigram holds that
"hard cases make bad law."3 In Tina Bennis's case, bad history makes hard
law.
I. No WAY To TREAT AN INNOCENT LADY
A. Michigan Adds Insult to Injury
The Wayne County, Michigan police discovered John Bennis with a
prostitute who was performingfellatio on him.4 When the police discovered
Bennis, he was in the 1977 Pontiac that he jointly owned with his wife, Tina
Bennis.5 The car was parked in a residential Detroit neighborhood that had
been plagued by prostitution for several years.6 John Bennis was charged
with "gross indecency," for which he subsequently was convicted and fined.7
The State of Michigan was not satisfied, however, with exposing John
Bennis's infidelity. He and Tina Bennis were named as co-defendants in an
in personam action to have the car declared a public nuisance8 and abated.'
3. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
4. State v. Bennis, Transcript of Nov. 2, 1988 Bench Ruling of Trial Court in
Nuisance Abatement Proceeding ("Trial Transcript") at 180-81, reprinted in Petitioner's
Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bennis v. Michigan (U.S. 94-8729, March
29, 1995).
5. Order/Judgment (Nov. 16, 1988), reprinted in Petitioner's Appendix to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Bennis v. Michigan (U.S. 94-8729, March 29, 1995).
6. Trial Transcript at 182-87.
7. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.7.
8. MICH. CoMp. LAW ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996) ("Any building,
vehicle, boat, aircrat, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or
prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other
disorderly persons .... is declared a nuisance .... and all ... nuisances shall be
enjoined and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any
person or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or
maintains any building, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth
in this section is guilty of a nuisance.").
9. Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. 1994). The Michigan
[Vol. 61
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At the trial, Tina Bennis testified-without contradiction-that she had no
knowledge of her husband's use of the car.'0 The trial court nonetheless
concluded that her interest was subject to abatement as a public nuisance.'
The court ordered the car sold and the proceeds deposited in the Michigan
Treasury without any allowance for Mrs. Bennis's interest in the car. 2
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on statutory grounds. 3 The
appellate court held "that the prosecutor was required to prove that defendants
knew that their vehicle was being used for [prostitution]," but found that "the
record in this case does not support a finding that Mrs. Bennis knew that the
vehicle was being used for such purpose."'"
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the appellate court's
view of the statute. 5 The court went on to address Tina Bennis's argument
abatement statute provides:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established
in an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be
entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct the
removal from the building or place of all furniture, fixtures and contents
therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the manner provided for the sale
of chattels under execution...
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court
to be a nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same
order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein
provided.
(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon
the sale of any furniture, fixture, contents, vehicle, boat or aircraft as
provided in this section, the officer executing the order of the court shall,
after deducting the expenses of keeping such property and costs of such
sale, pay all liens according to their priorities .... and shall pay the
balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of the
state ...
MICH. COMp. LAW ANN. § 600.3825 (1987).
10. Trial Transcript at 154.
11. Michigan has not always defined "nuisance" so broadly. See People v.
Bitonti, 10 N.W.2d 329, 330 (Mich. 1943) ("A nuisance involves the idea of repetition
or continuity, and is not to be predicated upon proof of a single isolated prohibited
act.").
12. Order/Judgment.
13. State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
14. Id. at 733.
15. The statute at issue provides that "[p]roof of knowledge of the existence of
the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required." Michigan
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that the statute violated the Takings 6 and Due Process 7 clauses of the
United States Constitution. The court determined Tina Bennis's innocence to
be "without constitutional consequence." 8  Surveying the United States
Supreme Court's forfeiture cases, the court found that "[h]istorically,
consideration was not given to the innocence of an owner because the property
subject to forfeiture was the evil sought to be remedied." 9 The Michigan
court concluded:
Review of the controlling cases persuades us that no constitutional violation
results from the abatement of Mrs. Bennis' interest in the vehicle. The
United States Supreme Court indisputably allows forfeiture of an innocent
owner's property, unless evidence was submitted that the property was
stolen or used without the consent of the owner.20
In Michigan, Tina Bennis discovered, innocence is no defense.
B. No Justice For A Woman Scorned
Dissatisfied with her treatment at the hands of the Michigan Supreme
Court, Tina Bennis petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court.2' The Court granted her petition, but affirmed the judgment of the
Michigan Supreme Court, with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist writing for
a 5-4 majority.22
The Chief Justice explained that "a long and unbroken line of cases holds
that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to
which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to
be put to such use."' The Chief Justice cited six cases as falling within that
"long and unbroken line:" The Palmyra,24 Harmony v. United States,25
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 494.
19. Id. at 493-94.
20. Id. at 495.
21. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 35 (1995).
22. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996). The Chief Justice was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 996. Justice
Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. Id. at 1103. Justice Kennedy
dissented separately. Id. at 1010.
23. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
24. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
25. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844). Harmony is more frequently cited by the Court
as United States v. Brig Malek Adhel.
[Vol. 61
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Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 26 Van Oster v. Kansas,27 J.W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,2 and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co.29
In The Palmyra, the Court rejected the shipowner's contention that the
vessel could not be forfeited for privateering unless he was convicted of that
charge.3" The Chief Justice focused on the Palmyra Court's language that
"[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence
is attached primarily to the thing."'" The Chief Justice gleaned similar
language from Harmony:
Justice Story wrote for the Court that in in rem admiralty proceedings "the
acts of the master and crew ... bind the interest of the owner of the ship,
whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the
law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by reason of their
unlawful or wanton wrongs.
32
Dobbins's Distillery involved the forfeiture of a distillery and the
appurtenant real estate; the lessee of that property had fraudulently avoided
federal taxes on liquor distilled there.33 Dobbins's Distillery also yielded
language helpful to the Chief Justice's position:
Cases often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on account
of the fraud, neglect, or misconduct of those intrusted with its possession,
care, and custody, even when the owner is otherwise without fault... and
it has always been held ... that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest
of the owner.., whether he be innocent or guilty.34
Like Bennis, Van Oster and J. W. Goldsmith involved automobile
forfeiture. The Chief Justice related the facts of Van Oster: "Van Oster
purchased an automobile from a dealer but agreed that the dealer might retain
possession for use in its business. The dealer allowed an associate to use the
automobile, and the associate used it for the illegal transportation of
intoxicating liquor."35 The State of Kansas forfeited the vehicle, despite Van
26. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
27. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
28. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
29. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
30. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
31. Id. (quoting The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827)).
32. Id. (quoting Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844)).
33. Id.
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Oster's plea of ignorance of the illegal use. The Supreme Court upheld the
forfeiture: "It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon
the owner of property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action
of one to whom he has entrusted it. . . .certain uses of property may be
regarded as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril
1136
Van Oster relied on J. W. Goldsmith, in which a dealership lost the title
to a car retained as security when the purchaser illegally transported
alcohol. 37  According to the Chief Justice, the JW. Goldsmith "[c]ourt
discussed the arguments for and against allowing the forfeiture of the interest
of an owner who was 'without guilt,' and concluded that 'whether the reason
for [the challenged forfeiture scheme] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced."'3 8
Finally, the Chief Justice relied on Calero-Toledo, the Court's most
recent pronouncement on innocence as a defense to forfeiture. The Calero-
Toledo Court read the above cases to stand for the proposition that "the
innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly
been rejected as a defense."39
This unbroken string of precedent was fatal to Tina Bennis's claim:
Petitioner is in the same position as the various owners involved in the
forfeiture cases beginning with The Palmyra in 1827. She did not know
that her car would be used in an illegal activity that would subject it to
forfeiture. But under these cases the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect her interest against forfeiture by the
govenment.40
As the Chief Justice saw it, Michigan's abatement of Tina Bennis's
ownership interest in the car simply followed the historical
practice-established from the nation's earliest years-of forfeiting property
used in criminal activity. Even the innocent must bear the cost of the war
against crime.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, while joining in the Chief Justice's opinion,
wrote separately to explain her vote.4 She took comfort in two facts:
36. Id. (quoting Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926)).
37. Id. at 999.
38. Id. (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
510-11 (1921)).
39. Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974)).
40. Id
41. Id. at 1003.
[Vol. 61
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(1) Michigan styled the proceeding an "equitable action;" and (2) the forfeited
car was not worth very much.42
Justice Clarence Thomas also wrote separately to explain his vote to
affirm the judgment of abatement.43 He conceded that "[o]ne unaware of the
history of forfeiture laws and 200 years of this Court's precedent regarding
such laws might well assume that such a scheme is lawless-a violation of due
process."" Instead of relief, however, he offered Tina Bennis a lesson in the
virtues of judicial restraint: "This case is ultimately a reminder that the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable."4
While recognizing Michigan's overreaching in Mrs. Bennis's case, Justice
Thomas relied on the Chief Justice's assurance that the practice of depriving
innocent owners of their property was sanctified by tradition.46 "As detailed
in the Court's opinion and the cases cited therein, forfeiture of property
without proof of the owner's wrongdoing, merely because it was 'used' in or
was an 'instrumentality' of crime has been permitted in England and this
country, both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments."47
With all due respect, we believe that Justice Thomas too quickly accepted
the Chief Justice's partial account of forfeiture tradition. A fuller account of
that tradition might well have changed Justice Thomas's vote. We fill in the
gaps of the Chief Justice's account in the next Section.
II. FORFEITURE'S HISTORY OF ABUSE
The Chief Justice, in his usual style, included only the essentials in his
account of the tradition of civil forfeiture. To fully understand that tradition,
however, we must begin with the English origins of the practice. We also
address forfeiture's introduction into American law. We then turn to the
treatment of innocent owners in forfeiture proceedings under both English and
American law.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1001.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1001-02 (citations omitted).
46. Reliance on history is a familiar theme in Justice Thomas's jurisprudence.
See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1525 (1995) (Thomas
J., concurring in the judgment) (examining historic treatment of anonymous speech).
47. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002.
1996]
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A. Forfeiture at Common Law
English law recognized three types of forfeiture: (1) deodand; (2)
attainder forfeiture; and (3) admiralty forfeitures. Deodand and attainder
forfeitures have the longest history; admiralty forfeitures did not become
prevalent until the seventeenth century.48
1. Deodand
A deodand is an instrument causing a person's death, e.g., a pistol or a
runaway carriage.49 Forfeiture to the Crown under the common law of a
deodand is the oldest method of forfeiture." The deodand "may have served
as an alternative to the blood feud of early justice-the instrument of death
replacing the slayer's kin as the object of vengeance."'" In theory, the funds
from the liquidated deodand were used to pay for masses for the deceased.S2
In time, though, the Crown came to profit from deodand.53
48. See Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Lavs, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1154 (1990) ("The in rem proceeding ... developed in the
seventeenth century.").
49. 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 419
(reprinted 1980)(1736) ("Regularly that moveable good, that brings a man to an
untimely death is forfeit to the king, and it is usually granted by the king to his
almoner to distribute in charitable uses."). The word "deodand" derives from the Latin
"Deo dandum," which means "to be given to God." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974).
50. See generally Walter Woodbum Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of
Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV.
696 (1916) (tracing the origins of deodand to ancient civilizations).
51. James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 771 (1977). On the blood feud, see generally
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 192-99 (1981).
52. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 473 (1968).
53. Id. ("In process of time.., the law appears to have been perverted from its
original intention, and while ulterior object for which the forfeiture was inflicted,
appears to have been gradually lost sight of, the forfeiture itself was retained, but in
favour of the crown; and the fruits of it became and have continued, even down to this
day, a mere source of revenue to the crown."). See also ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 116-17 (R. L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G. Stein eds., 1978) (1762-63)
("By the English law of deoda[nd], what ever was the occasion[s] of a mans [sic]
death was thus devoted; formerly the clergy claimed it, and now the king, as being the
head of the church.").
(Vol. 61
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Some courts have explained modem in rem forfeiture as the descendant
of deodand.5 4 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. also subscribed to this view."
After all, like modem American forfeiture statutes under which the
government proceeds directly against offending objects (e.g., a yacht used to
transport marijuana) as if these objects were culpable for the offense, the
Crown proceeded directly against the deodand as if it were guilty of a crime.
But, in fact, there is little evidence that modem forfeiture law descended from
deodand. 6 First and most obviously, property became deodand only if it
caused a human's death. 7 Second, attempts to raise the analogy of forfeiture
to deodand were specifically rejected by English courts. 8 Third, Grant
Gilmore and Charles Black, in their Treatise on Admiralty, found little
evidence for Holmes's contention that deodand is the evolutionary ancestor of
modem forfeiture law.59 Sea-going ships that caused a man's death were
never forfeited as deodands.' Fourth, deodand was strictly limited to the
instrument of harm, unlike modem forfeiture." Fifth, deodands were always
54. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681
(1974).
55. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 23-26 (1881).
56. See Schecter, supra note 48, at 1154 ("Modem forfeiture law originated,
independent ofdeodands, during England's seventeenth century maritime expansion.").
See also Maxeiner, supra note 51, at 772 ("The only English authority cited as proof
that deodand represents a general forfeiture principle is one sentence from St.
Germain's Doctor& Student dialogues, published in 1530 .... But a careful reading
... does not support that conclusion.").
57. 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 419 ("they are not forfeit till death be found...
58. "In 1766, in a case before the Court of the Exchequer, the Crown argued that
deodand represented a general principle of forfeiture law. Chief Baron Parker rejected
the argument, citing Chief Justice Vaughn for the proposition that 'goods as goods,
cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but [only] men whose goods they
are."' Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766) (citing
with approval Sheppard v. Gosnold, Vaughn 159, 172, 124 Eng. Rep. 1018, 1024 (C.P.
1677)). Sheppard is also quoted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 637 (1886).
59. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 590
(2d ed. 1975).
60. 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 66
(Garland ed. 1978) (1716); 1 HALE supra note 49, at 422.
61. Compare 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 420 ("If a man fall into the water, and
the water carry him under the wheel of a mill, whereby he is killed, the wheel is
forfeited, but not the mill.
If a weight of earth fall upon a worker in a mine and kill him, the weight of the
earth is forfeit, not the whole mine.") with United States v. Sixty Acres, More or Less,
with Improvements, Located in Etowa County, Alabama, 727 F. Supp 1414, 1422
(N.D. Ala. 1990), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1990), subsequent decision
rev'd, 930 F.2d 857 (1lth Cir. 1991) ("The United States argues that all of Texas
1996]
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tried in criminal courts.62 Finally, the superstition that inanimate objects can
be culpable for harming humans has been discarded with the advance of
science.
Deodand was questioned even before the adoption of the Constitution:
"Even Blackstone, who is not known as a biting critic of the English legal
tradition, condemned the seizure of the property of the innocent as based upon
a 'superstition' inherited from the 'blind days' of feudalism."63  Justice
Joseph Story similarly condemned it: "deodand ... seems a peculiar case,
growing out of the avarice of the church, and the superstition of the laity, in
ancient times."' Despite its archaic nature, deodand survived in England
until 1846.65 But, whatever its status in England, "[d]eodands did not
become part of the common-law tradition of this country."66 In sum, modem
forfeiture practice did not descend from the "guilty property" fiction of
deodand.
2. Attainder Forfeitures
Attainder forfeitures were the largest class of forfeitures at English
law.67 The government proceeded against the property owner in personam.
The convicted felon's personal property was forfeited to the Crown, while his
real property was forfeited to his lord.68 A conviction for treason, however,
would be forfeited under a literal reading of § 881(a)(7) if Texas were owned by one
person, and if one acre of it was used in a drug deal with the owner's knowledge or
consent. The larger the tract and the smaller the portions misused, the more
questionable may become the constitutionality of a literal application of the § 881 (a)(7)
language. This court is happy not to have had to deal with this question.").
62. Hyde, supra note 50, at 729 ("The trials of deodand never took place before
ecclesiastical courts, but always before criminal courts.").
63. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1971)
(Harlan, J.) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, c. 8, *300 (1765)).
64. United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 413 (1814)
(Story, J., dissenting).
65. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170-71 (1973). Repeal of deodand faced little opposition at that
point. Harry Smith, From Deodandto Dependency, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 389, 402
(1967) ("Deodand ... had few supporters, and came to an end mourned by few.").
66. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
67. Stuart David Kaplan, Note, The Forfeiture of Profits Under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Enabling Courts to Realize RICO's
Potential, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 751 (1984).
68. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 413 (2d. ed.
[Vol. 61
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rendered all of the felon's property, personal and real, forfeitable to the
Crown. 9 No property was forfeited unless the owner of the property was
first duly convicted of a criminal offense, and no forfeiture resulted from
conviction for a misdemeanor.7"
William Blackstone justified attainder forfeitures as an appropriate
sanction for the property owner's violation of the social compact. "The true
reason and only substantial ground of any forfeiture for crimes consists in this;
that all property is derived from society, being one of those civil rights which
are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom,
which every man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities."7'
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen provided a slightly different explanation:
forfeitures "have their source in the feudal theory that property, especially
landed property, was held of a superior lord upon the condition of discharging
duties attaching to it, and was forfeited by the breach of those conditions."
72
1979) ("conviction brought forfeiture of all the felon's property: his chattels to the
king, his lands to the feudal lord."). Conviction also resulted in corruption of blood.
"The effect of corruption of blood was that descent could not be traced through a
person whose blood was corrupted." 1 JAMES FrrzJAMEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 487 (1870); 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 356. See
also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 109 (2d ed.
1981) (forfeiture for felony "was rationalised by the proposition that the felony so
corrupted his blood, that he could have no heirs.").
69. 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 138 (reprinted 1987)(1803).
See also BAKER, supra note 68, at 206 ("Forfeiture, in the original sense occurred
when a tenant committed treason; in which case his land went to the crown, and the
rights of the mesne lord were extinguished."). The Crown renounced its claim to
forfeiture of land for felony in the Magna Carta. 3 W. S. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 69 (3d ed. 1927).
70. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
455 (5th ed. 1956) ("Norman kings sometimes enacted that a particular offense would
be visited with the king's 'full forfeiture', [sic] and so the heavy penalty of loss of
chattels might be inflicted for crimes which fall short of felony. Henry I had to
abandon this, and in his coronation charter promised what seems to be a return to the
Anglo-Saxon system of pre-appointed fines or wite."); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 97 (1765) ("In short, the true criterion
of felony is forfeiture.").
71. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at 289.
72. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 68, at 488. See also PLUCKNETr, supra note 70, at
442 ("Felony is a feudal conception particularly applying to the breach of fidelity
which should accompany the feudal relationship which has been consecrated by
homage. Its characteristic punishment is therefore loss of tenement-escheat."); 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52 at 82 ("[Florfeiture ... can hardly be described
as [a] mode by which proprietary rights are acquired. The lord's rights have been
there all along; the tenant's rights disappear; the lord has all along been entitled to the
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Both theories presume that property is merely a social construct, and that
society-which confers property rights-can revoke those rights for
transgressions against society. Less philosophical, but more realistic, is
Theodore Plucknett's view: "The principle of forfeiture was designed to
weaken the power of opposition to the Crown at the expense of possibly
innocent members of the rebel's family."7 3 At bottom, attainder was about
consolidating the power of the Crown: "children are pledges to the prince of
the father's obedience."'74 Despite its harshness, England did not abolish "the
barbarous system of ... forfeiture which reduced to beggary the families of
men of substance who had strayed from the paths of virtue" until 1870.75
Only then, apparently, could the Crown feel secure in its authority.
The Founders of the American Republic, however, had a different view
of the nature of property and the limits of government power. They regarded
property as both a natural right and the cornerstone of individual liberty.76
Consequently, the Founders rejected the use of forfeiture to consolidate
government authority in this country. The Constitution's framers reined in
forfeiture's worst abuses by forbidding bills of attainder," and limiting the
penalty for treason by providing that "no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
attainted.0 8 Thus, forfeiture could no longer be used as a weapon to beggar
the families of traitors. Against this constitutional backdrop, the first
Congress also abolished attainder forfeiture. 79  The state governments
land; he is entitled to it now, and, since he has no tenant, he can enjoy it in de
mesne."). But see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at 383-84 ("With us in England
forfeiture of lands and tenements to the crown for treason is by no means derived from
the feodal policy.., but was antecedent to the establishment of that system in this
island; being transmitted from our Saxon ancestors, and forming a part of the ancient
Scandinavian constitution.").
73. PLUCKNETr, supra note 70, at 713.
74. See 4 HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 404 (14th ed. 1903) ("forfeitures, whereby one's posterity must suffer, are
eminently calculated to restrain a man, not only by the dread of personal punishment,
but also by his passions and natural affections, from committing this offence... For
children are pledges to the prince of the father's obedience.").
75. EDwARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 351 (2d ed. 1920).
76. David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting Depictions
of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 475-81
(1993) (collecting views of Founders on the importance of property rights).
77. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. England repealed corruption of blood in 1814
for all crimes save murder and treason. 4 STEPHEN, supra note 74, at 406.
79. Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 117, c. 9, § 24.
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followed the federal government's lead in curtailing the use of forfeiture.
According to Chancellor Kent:
The forfeiture of the estate is very much reduced in practice in this country,
and the corruption of blood is, I apprehend, universally abolished. In New
York, forfeiture of property for crimes, is confined to the case of a
conviction for treason; and, by a law of the colony of Massachusetts, as
early as 1641, escheats and forfeitures, upon the death of the ancestor,
"natural, unnatural, casual, or judicial" were abolished for ever."0
Thus, in the early days of the Republic, forfeiture was largely eliminated
as a tool of government oppression at both the federal and state level.
3. Admiralty Forfeitures
Although not the first English forfeiture statutes, the Navigation Acts of
the mid-seventeenth century were the first to allow for in rem forfeiture."
Prior to these Acts, "[i]f the owner was available, the forfeiture evidently was
imposed only upon confession or adjudication of his guilt." 2 In rem
procedures under the Navigation Acts allowed the Crown to prosecute the
offending property directly, naming the property itself as the defendant. 3
The legal fiction was that the property itself violated the law. Thus, no
conviction of the property owner was required because the property owner
was, legally, not being punished; only the property was found 'guilty.'
The Navigation Acts were intended to strengthen England's naval
prowess. By requiring that most imports and exports from England be carried
in English ships, the Navigation Acts protected the English maritime industry
from foreign competition." Given the importance of the maritime industry
80. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 422-23 (reprinted 1971)
(1st ed. 1826-1830). See also 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
318 (reprinted 1971)(lst ed. 1826-1830) ("some [states] have taken away the power
of forfeiture absolutely without any exception.") (citing Ohio, Tennessee, Indiana,
Illinois, and Missouri).
81. For a discussion of the earlier acts, see Matthew Hale, A Treatise in Three
Parts, Pars Tertia, Concerning the Custom of Goods imported and "exported,"
reprinted in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE To THE LAW OF ENGLAND (Francis
Hargrave ed., 1787).
82. Maxeiner, supra note 51, at 775.
83. LAWRENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS 111 (1973).
84. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 464-65 (reprinted 1976; R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner,
eds.)(1776) ("As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act
of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations in England.").
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to British commerce, courts enforced the Acts strictly. "Violation of the Acts
resulted in forfeiture of both the illegally carried goods and the ship that
transported them. The English courts construed these statutes so that the act
of an individual seaman, undertaken without the knowledge of master or
owner, could cause a forfeiture of the entire ship."85 According to Chief
Baron Parker of Exchequer, the Acts were:
negative, absolute, and prohibitory; they not only operate upon the goods,
but equally the ship, there is not a syllable that hints at the privity or
consent of the master, mate or owners. The reason of penning this clause
in these strong terms is to prevent as much as possible its being evaded, for
if the privity or consent of the master, mate or owners, had been made
necessary to the forfeiture, it would have opened a door for perpetual
evasion, and the provisions of this excellent act for the increase of the
navigation would have been defeated. 6
England repealed the Navigation Acts in favor of free trade in 1849."
The Navigation Acts were also enforced in the American colonies before
the Revolution."8 Enforcement differed in the colonies, however, in that suits
were brought in the vice-admiralty courts, rather than in the Exchequer as in
England. 9 The vice-admiralty courts were not limited to hearing maritime
Smith, of course, opposed the protectionist functions of the Acts. Id. See also 3
HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, NEw COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 160-61
(14th ed. 1903) ("Until the year 1825, this subject was regulated by the Navigation
Act of 12 Charles II. (1660), c.18 ... These provisions (it is said) were framed with
the object of dealing a blow at our own sugar islands, which were disaffected to the
Parliament, and still held out for Charles II, by stopping or crippling their trade with
the Dutch (b); and with the object also of clipping in the wings of those of our opulent
and enterprising neighbors. With these objects in view, this law prohibited all ships
of foreign nations from trading with any English plantation without a license from the
council of state. In 1651, the prohibition was extended also to ships trading with the
mother country; consequently, no goods were suffered to be imported from England,
or into any English dependence, in any other than English bottoms, or in the ships of
that European nation, of which the merchandize imported was the genuine growth or
manufacture.").
85. Maxeiner, supra note 51, at 774.
86. Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 232-33, 145 Eng. Rep. 764, 766 (Ex.
1766) (quoted in United States v. Hutchinson, 26 F. Cas. 446, 448 (D. Me. 1868) (No.
15,431)).
87. 3 STEPHEN, supra note 84, at 161-62.
88. See, e.g., The "Freemason, " 167 Eng. Rep. 469 (Burrell 55) (1767) (upholding
the forfeiture of a vessel and its goods for illegal importation into Boston harbor).
89. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 483 (1847) (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting); Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEG.
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cases; they also heard cases arising from the Sugar and Stamp Acts.9 The
colonists bitterly condemned this expansion of the jurisdiction of the vice-
admiralty courts beyond the realm of maritime law to enforcing revenue
provisions "completely divorced from the sea and its commerce. '  Not
surprisingly, Parliament established the vice-admiralty courts in America
without the consent of the colonies.' The expansion of the admiralty
jurisdiction had a significant advantage for the Crown; by resorting to the
vice-admiralty courts the Crown avoided trying its cases before a jury.93
This procedural innovation was fought by the colonists as a deprivation of the
constitutional rights of Englishmen.94 A rising young lawyer, John Adams,
made his name in the colonies by defending a merchant, John Hancock,
against charges of evading custom duties that were brought in the vice-
admiralty court.95 Adams' defense centered on the deprivation of Hancock's
constitutional right to a trial by jury.96 Adams' legal assault on the
expansion of the vice-admiralty courts' jurisdiction had ramifications beyond
the world of commerce; one count of the Declaration of Independence's
indictment against the Crown charges that:
HIST. 253, 357 (1967). The colonies did not have the multiple courts with limited
jurisdiction as existed then in England. Id. at 261. Exchequer courts were never
established in America. Id. at 361.
90. Surrency, supra note 89, at 357.
91. CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 207 (1960).
92. Surrency, supra note 89, at 266 ("The British Government sought to exercise
the function of creating courts directly through an act of Parliament only once, when
it established admiralty courts in the colonies. Since there could be little doubt that
these were created under an act of Parliament and were not controlled by the colonies
may in part explain the colonial hostility to them.").
93. L. Kinvin Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250, 257-58 (1962). Before the creation
of the vice-admiralty courts violations of the Navigation Acts were tried to a jury in
the common law courts. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 140 (1943).
94. Waring, 46 U.S. at 483, 484 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Several colonies
passed statutes providing for admiralty juries, but these statutes were overturned by the
government in Britain. Surrency, supra note 89, at 359.
95. UBBELOHDE, supra note 91, at 125.
96. Id. The Crown eventually dropped the case. Id. at 127.
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He has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our
Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their
Acts of pretended Legislation:
For depriving us, in many cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury ...
The colonists, however, were not defenseless before this usurpation of
their constitutional rights. Merchants who had their goods forfeited by the
admiralty courts retaliated against customs collectors with actions in common
law courts for wrongful seizure of their goods.98 In the common law courts,
"[c]ivil juries countered the enforcement powers of the admiralty courts and
the discretion of the collectors of customs." 99
Another difference between England and the colonies was that the
colonial vice-admiralty courts used both in personam and in rem procedures.
In England, "the admiralty could proceed only in rem, that is, against a vessel
liable for the obligation sued upon.""' In the colonies, by contrast, "[i]n the
majority of cases the process seems to be in personam in the first instance..
. . The action in rem seems to have been relied upon primarily in cases in
which no respondent to an in personam suit could be found within the
jurisdiction . . . '"0' Thus, the American vice-admiralty courts ordinarily
resorted to in rem procedures only when the owner of the vessel could not be
subjected to an in personam suit. In rem procedures were a secondary means
of enforcement.
97. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
98. UBBELOHDE, supra note 91, at 165-71; Douglas Lamar Jones, "The Caprice
of Juries": The Enforcement of the Jeffersonian Embargo in Massachusetts, 24 AM.
J. LEG. HIST. 307, 310 (1980).
99. Jones, supra note 98, at 310.
100. Wroth, supra note 93, at 264. But see Thomas Lambert Mears, The History
of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 312,349 (reprinted 1968)(1908) ("the process was a proceeding in rem in the
sense that if the defendant did not appear the suit could go on without in any way
touching the person, and that by the operation of the judgment the defendant was
deprived of his property in the chattel, unless he appeared, in which case the
proceedings went on in the ordinary course as an action in personam.").
101. Wroth, supra note 93, at 266.
[Vol. 61
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/3
THE FORFEITURE TRADITION
B. Treatment of Innocent Owners
1. English Law
While the innocence of owners is formally irrelevant to in rem
forfeiture, 2 Anglo-American law has for centuries struggled to protect the
property interests of innocent owners from in personam forfeiture. The in
personam tradition is found in the history of attainder forfeitures. Particularly
relevant to Bennis is the law's traditional protection of wives, blameless of
their husbands' criminal wrongdoing, from forfeiture of their property. This
protection arose from the earliest times. At the time of Edward III, "in case
of a feoffment to a baron andfeme in fee, if the baron committed felony, the
land was not forfeited, but survived entirely to the feme.. ,13 Later, an
innocent wife's dower rights were forfeited'"' to the crown upon conviction
of her husband for treason, but a felony conviction of her husband did not
result in forfeiture of her dower interests." Even forfeiture for treason
102. Because in rem proceedings are formally against the property, the only
question is the "culpability" of the property. Legislatures, however, are often unwilling
to accept fully the logic of in rem proceedings; statutes providing for an in rem
forfeiture often contain an innocent-owner defense. See, e.g., Comprehensive
Forfeiture Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1992) ("(a) The following shall be
subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property shall exist in them: (7) All
real property ... which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or party, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest of any owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge
or consent of that owner."). "The prevalence of protection for innocent owners in such
legislation does ... lend support to the conclusion that elementary notions of fairness
require some attention to the impact of a seizure on the rights of innocent parties."
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. 3 W.F. FINLASON, REEVES' HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 335 (reprinted
1981)(1880).
104. MILsOM, supra note 68, at 167 ("Dower was the right of the widow to hold
a proportion of her dead husband's land, generally a third, as long as she lived. She
would hold it of her husband's heir not of his lord; and unless the heir was an infant,
the lord was not concerned.").
105. 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 359 ("tho [sic] her husband be attainted of felony
or murder, she shall not lose her dower. But by attainder of her husband of high
treason or petit treason the wife shall lose her dower at this same day."); 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 69, at 195 ("In Edward VI's reign [an innocent wife's]
rights were secured also against the claims of the lord or Crown to escheat or
forfeiture if her husband committed felony; but the old law remained if her husband
committed treason, whether grand or petit.").
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could be evaded by putting the wife's property interests in the form of
jointure10 6 rather than dower." 7
This protection of the joint property interests of innocent wives is
consistent with protections for other innocent owners. Theodore Plucknett
reports that, even in cases of treason, the law was "specifically modified in
particular cases . . . to prevent the forfeiture of legal estates held by [the
traitor] to the use of other persons."'0 3 Not only interests in real property
were protected; protection also extended in many cases to personal property.
According to Matthew Hale, "[ait common law the king by attainder of
treason was not entitled to any chattels, that the party had en autre droit, as
executor, or administrator, or in right of a corporation aggregate."' 
0 9
Similarly, the 14th-century Statute of Staples protected the personal property
of innocent bailors from being forfeited along with the property of convicted
bailees."'
And there is evidence that English lawmakers were uneasy about forfeiting an
innocent wife's dower interest even when her husband was convicted of treason; there
was a time during the 16th century when even the dower interests of an innocent wife
were immune to forfeiture upon her husband's conviction of treason. See PLUCKNETT,
supra note 70, at 713 ("[florfeiture defeated dower in spite of parliamental protests.
. . until 1 Edw. VI, c. 11 (1547), preserved dower in all cases; but this was soon
repealed as to treason by 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 11 (1552).").
106. Jointure was "a competent livelihood of freehold for the wife, of lands or
tenements to take effect presently in possession or profit after the decease of the
husband, for the life of the wife at least." 1 STEPHEN, supra note 68, at 157 (citing
Co. Litt. 366).
107. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at 381-82 ("a wife's jointure is not forfeitable
for the treason of her husband, because settled upon her previous to the treason
committed. But her dower is forfeited by the express provision of statutes 5 & 6
Edward VI, c. 11 [Treason 1551]."). See also 4 STEPHEN, supra note 74, at 403 ("a
wife's jointure was not forfeitable for the treason of her husband, because settled on
her previous to the treason committed."); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 456 (Garland ed. 1978)(1716) ("But it seems that the wife
never forfeited lands given jointly to her husband and her, but only for the Year and
Day and Waste.").
108. PLUCKNETT, supra note 70, at 581.
109. 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 251-52.
110. 27 Edw. III, st. 2, c. 19 (1353) ("No merchant or other person, of what
condition soever he be, shall lose or forfeit his goods or merchandise for any trespass
or forfeiture incurred by his servant, unless his act is by the command and consent of
this master, or he has offended in the office in which his master put him, or unless the
master is in some other way bound to answer for the servant's act by law merchant as
has been used heretofore."). See also PLUCKNETT, supra note 70, at 474-75 ("The
Crown was constantly straining the law of forfeiture, and had obtained decisions that
if a bailee incurs a forfeiture, the goods bailed to him are liable to it and the
[Vol. 61
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Parliament had to stay vigilant to protect innocent owners from royal
avarice. English kings were "constantly straining the law of forfeiture, " 1"
to the point where the Crown had come to take title to even stolen goods in
the thief's possession." 2 Parliament ended this royal abuse in 1529, giving
innocent victims the right to retrieve their property.' 13
Also relevant is the law's historical treatment of trusts for the benefit of
a husband and his family. If such trusts were created in good faith, the
interests of innocent family members in these trusts were not forfeited even
though the convicted husband's interests were forfeited to the crown.
According to William Hawkins,
it seems to be in great measure settled, that the trust of a term granted by
a man for the use of himself, his wife and children, etc. is liable ... to be
forfeited, if fraudulently made with an intent to avoid a subsequent
forfeiture; but that it shall be forfeited so far only as it is reserved to the
benefit of the party himself, if made bona fide, whether before or after
marriage, or good consideration without fraud.... .4
Any fair reading of English legal history makes plain the law's long-
standing reluctance to allow innocent owners to suffer the ill-consequences of
attainder forfeitures. Indeed, even the law of deodand-which proceeded
merchandise in his hands goes to the Crown.... Some boroughs had succeeded in
maintaining a custom that the rule should not apply to them, and others got charters
exempting them from its operation. It was this indefensible rule which the statute
finally abrogated for the whole country .... ") (citations omitted).
111. PLUCKNETT, supra note 70, at 474.
112. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 69, at 280 ("But in the case of goods we must
always remember that, if the goods had been taken under such circumstances as
amounted to a felony, and the thief had been convicted, the right of recapture was
subject to the Crown's rights to have these goods as a forfeiture. It was only under
special circumstances that the rights of the true owner overrode the rights of the
Crown."). The true owner was forced to compete with the Crown in enforcing the
criminal law in order to recover his property. Id at 330 ("it was only if the owner
made fresh pursuit, captured the thief with the goods in his possession, and convicted
him as the result of the appeal, that the owner saved his goods from forfeiture."). Id.
at 362-63.
113. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at 362 ("The statute 21 Henry VIII, c. 11
[Restitution of Goods Stolen, 1529] ... enacts that if any person be convicted of
larceny by the evidence of the party robbed, he shall have full restitution of his money,
goods and chattels, or the value of them out of the offender's goods, if he has any, by
a writ to be granted by the justices.").
114. 1 HAWKINS, supra note 60, at 640. See also 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 247
("At common law the king by attainder of treason was not entitled to uses or trusts
belonging to the party attaint .... ").
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against the property and, hence, was formally unconcerned with the culpability
of property owners" 5-was limited in practice by juries to avoid inflicting
disproportionate penalties on innocent owners."6
The lone authority we have found rejecting protection of innocent joint
owners of personal property is Blackstone. Blackstone insists that "because
the king cannot have a joint property with any person in one entire chattel
... the king shall have the whole" if he is entitled to any part through
forfeiture."7 According to Blackstone, even innocent owners lose their
interests when the crown acquires property interests through forfeiture that
cannot be separated from interests held by others because it is beneath "the
dignity of the crown to be partner with a subject.""' 8
Blackstone's opinion, of course, is weighty. But the basis for his
conclusion is suspect. In one of the cases he cites, Willion v. Berkley, "9 the
question is whether or not the crown is bound by the Statute De Donis
Conditionalibus,120 a statute designed to give better effect to the conditions
imposed by donors of interests in real property. The part of the opinion cited
by Blackstone to support his contention that the crown is entitled to innocent
owners' shares of forfeited chattel is clearly dicta.' 2' Another case relied
115. 2 HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
542-43 (14th ed. 1903) ("it mattered not whether the owner were concerned in the
killing or not; for if A. killed B. with the sword of C., the sword was forfeited as an
accursed thing.").
116. Id. at 543 ("But no thing being a deodand, unless it were presented as such
by the jury, juries very frequently took upon themselves to mitigate these forfeitures,
by finding only some trifling thing, or party of an entire thing, to have been the
occasion of death; and although such finding of the jury may have been hardly
warrantable by law, the Court, in general, refused to interfere.").
117. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 409
(1765) (original emphasis). He continues: "Thus, if a horse be given to the king and
a private person, the king shall have the sole property; if a bond be made to the king
and a subject, the king shall have the whole penalty; the debt or duty being one single
chattel; and so, if two persons have the property of a horse between them, or have a
joint debt owing them on a bond, and one of them assigns his part to the king, or is
attainted, whereby his moiety is forfeited to the crown; the king shall have the entire
horse, and entire debt." Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id.
119. 75 Eng. Rep. 339 (C.B. 1562).
120. 13 Edw. I, c. 1 (1285).
121. 75 Eng. Rep. 339, 370-71 (C.B. 1562) ("[1]t seems to me that the estate shall
be adjudged a fee simple conditional in the King, and that the remainder shall be void,
and that the King shall not be bound by the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus.... So
if a part of a thing entire comes to the King, the common law gives him the whole,
as if an obligation is made to two, and one of them is outlawed, the King shall have
the whole duty; so he shall have an entire ox or horse which the person outlawed held
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upon by Blackstone, Miles v. Williams,"2 involves the question of whether
or not a wife's debt is discharged by her husband's bankruptcy. The only
passage in the case relevant to Blackstone's point hardly speaks to the issue
of forfeiture: "If a bond be entered into two, and one grants the bond to the
King, the King may sue alone."'" Finally, a third case cited by Blackstone,
The Case of Mines, concernedthe crown's prerogative right to gold and silver
throughout the realm.' Because it would be too costly for the crown to
melt the copper and separate out gold and silver from the copper belonging
to other landowners, the law gave the crown title to extracted copper as
well.' Again, forfeiture was not at issue.
These are, at best, weak precedents for Blackstone's claim that innocent
joint owners of personal properties lost their interests to the crown upon
forfeiture. The weight of authority is to the contrary. Even if Blackstone
were correct, the forfeiture he hypothesizes could easily be evaded. Forfeiture
of personal property related only to the time of conviction. Bona fide
transfers before conviction gave good title to the purchaser." 6 Thus, the
accused only needed to sell his jointly-held property before conviction to
avoid forfeiting the innocent joint-owner's interest. 7
3. American Law
Even if we take Blackstone at his word-and thereby reject the authority
of Hale, Hawkins, and others-American law always treated innocent owners
more favorably than did English law. Americans early on adopted a hostile
attitude toward criminal forfeitures.' James Wilson of Pennsylvania, a
in common.") (citation omitted).
122. 88 Eng. Rep. 711 (Q.B. 1714).
123. Id. at 712.
124. 75 Eng. Rep. 472 (Ex. 1562).
125. Id. at 491-92.
126. 1 HALE, supra note 49, at 362; United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch.) 398, 410 (1814) (Story, J., dissenting).
127. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at 388 ("a traitor or felon may bonafide sell
any of his chattels, real or personal, for the sustenance of himself and family between
the fact and conviction.").
128. 2 KENT, supra note 80, at 317 ("the tendency of public opinion has been to
condemn forfeiture of property, at least in cases of felony, as being an unnecessary and
hard punishment of the felon's posterity."). See also LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENsE
TO STEAL: THE FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 34 (1996) ("In America the English law on
criminal forfeitures was known and either disliked or modified in the corporate
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prominent member of the Constitutional Convention, well understood the
dangerous nature of government's forfeiture powers.
Need I mention it as a rule, that punishments ought to be inflicted upon
those persons only, who have committed crimes-that the innocent ought
not to be blended in cruel and ruinous confusion with the guilty? Yes; it
is necessary to mention this as a rule: for, however plain and straight it is,
when viewed through the pure and clear ether of reason and humanity, it
has not been seen by those whom pride and avarice have blinded; nay, it
has been represented as a rule, crooked and distorted, by those who have
beheld it through the gross and refracting atmosphere of false policy and
false philosophy. The doctrines of forfeiture and corruption of blood have
found their ingenious advocates, as well as their powerful patrons. 9
As discussed above, Wilson and the other members of the Constitutional
Convention limited this abuse by abolishing corruption of blood and bills of
attainder.!3"
State governments went further. Chancellor Kent is clear that innocence
is protection against in personam forfeitures. According to Kent,
It is a rule of law, that the state, on taking lands by escheat, and even by
forfeiture, takes the title which the party had, and none other. It is taken
in the plight and extent by which he held it, and the estate of the




Similarly, "[e]very person convicted of any manner of treason, under the
laws of this state, forfeits his goods and chattels, as well as his land and
tenements; but the rights of third persons, existing at the time of the
commission of the treason, are saved."'3 Even a wife's dower interests
were protected from forfeiture for her husband's treason, contrary to English
practice.'33 Thus, American law provided broad protection to innocent
owners in in personam forfeiture proceedings.
129. 2 WILSON, supra note 1, at 630-31.
130. See supra text accompanying note 77-78.
131. 4 KENT, supra note 80, at 423.
132. 2 KENT, supra note 80, at 317.
133. Id. at 317-18. See also LEVY, supra note 128, at 37 ("states tended to
restrict forfeitures to the attainted individual and prevent the punishment of relatives.").
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S UNFAITHFUL HISTORY
Understanding forfeiture's origins sheds light on the forfeiture cases
relied on by the Court in Bennis. The English law of forfeiture influenced,
while not strictly determining, American law. While the first Congress
rejected attainder forfeiture, it did adopt in rem civil forfeiture to aid in the
collection of customs revenues.'
A. Forfeiting the Jury
In construing these forfeiture statutes, the Supreme Court laid the legal
foundation for current forfeiture practice by adopting most features of English
in rem forfeiture procedure under the Navigation Acts.'35  The Court
adopted English in rem practice for forfeitures under the admiralty jurisdiction
over a substantial historical objection. Arguing that the Seventh Amendment
required a trial by jury, former Attorney General Lee pointed out that "[a]ll
seizures [in England] for violation of the laws of revenue, trade, or navigation
are tried by a jury in the court of exchequer according to the course of the
common law."'36 Lee also urged that "[i]t was one of our serious
grievances, and of which we complained against Great Britain in our
remonstrances to the King, and in our addresses to the people of Great Britain,
while we were colonies, that the jurisdiction of the courts of vice-admiralty
was extended to cases of revenue."'37 Chief Justice John Marshall rejected
Lee's argument on the basis of La Vengeance, in which Lee had argued
unsuccessfully (on behalf of the United States!) that a jury was required
because forfeiture was a criminal action. 3  Justice Chase explained
Congress's motive in taking forfeiture from the jury: "The reason of the
legislature for putting seizures of this kind on the admiralty side of the court
was the great danger to the revenue if such cases should be left to the caprices
of juries."'39
134. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 145; Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29.
135. See generally Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and
the War on Drugs: Lessons From Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(forthcoming 1996).
136. United States v. The Schooner Betsey and Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch.) 443,
447 (1808).
137. Id. at 448.
138. Id. at 452 (citing United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 299
(1796)).
139. Id. at 446 n.**. See also Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 460
("But there is no provision, as the constitution originally was, from which it can be
1996]
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Congress's fear was well founded; early Americanjuries acquitted alleged
violators of the maritime laws at a much higher rate than did judges.'40 In
rem forfeiture allowed federal judges to circumvent jury nullification of
unpopular laws, thereby extending the power of the federal government.'4'
Michigan, too, no doubt feared that juries would fail to deliver the revenues
that it sought; this presumably was the state's motive for styling its abatement
proceedings as "equitable" actions. No doubt ajury would have been reluctant
to find a defendant like Tina Bennis "guilty" of a nuisance.
Tina Bennis was deprived of the right to a jury that she would have
enjoyed at common law in the Exchequer.' 4' History supports her claim to
ajury: the colonists bitterly condemned the Crown's usurpation of their right
inferred that civil causes in admiralty were to be tried by a jury, contrary to what the
framers of the constitution knew the mode of trial of issues of fact in the admiralty.").
The newly-independent states experimented with trial by jury in admiralty cases, but
the experiment was a failure. UBBELOHDE, supra note 91, at 195-99. ("But the
experiment soon proved unworkable.... Men with no knowledge of sea law or sea
customs could not be expected to prove able umpires in the causes that were put before
them."). Id. at 199.
140. Jones, supra note 98, at 326, n.8.
141. Id. at 324-30. In so doing, the federal government was simply following the
precedent set by the Crown. See UBBELOHDE, supra note 91, at 209 ("The British
position can be stated simply. Juries could not be relied upon to bring verdicts against
fellow colonists for violating the acts of trade and revenue. In seeking to place the
prosecution of such offenders out of the hands of juries, the British government had
traditionally granted the vice-admiralty courts concurrent jurisdiction ... which
allowed customs officials to circumvent the hazards ofjury trial."). Indeed, the federal
government followed the colonial precedent condemned by John Adams and other
revolutionaries. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 74 (1923) ("In view of the extreme fears
expressed by opponents of the federal system lest the right of jury trial should be
impaired, the jurisdiction thus granted to the District Courts, in the clause beginning
with the words 'including all seizures,' was extraordinary. For in England, the
admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to such 'seizures under laws of import,
navigation, or trade,' which, consequently, were triable, in that country, in a common
law Court by a jury. Although in some of the Colonies, trials of such cases had been
in the Colonial Admiralty Courts without jury, it seems curious that the framers of this
Bill should have deliberately included such cases of seizure within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the new Federal Courts and should thus have deliberately enlarged the
scope of such Courts and consequently the scope of trials without jury, beyond the
scope then existent in England.").
142. The trial court denied her motion for ajury trial. Trial Transcript at 39 (The
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to a jury trial.'43 More to the point, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished
forfeiture of goods seized on land, which were to be tried to a jury under the
common law jurisdiction of the court, from goods seized at sea.'" The
federal courts continued to follow the rule laid down by Chief Justice
Marshall. 45 But the Van Oster Court rejected as "unsubstantial" the claim
of a constitutional right to a jury trial in state court. 46  Having allowed
state governments to extend civil forfeiture well beyond its historical domain,
the Court should at least afford property owners the protection of a jury
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. In light of the state governments'
abuse of forfeiture, the Court should reconsider Van Oster's refusal to
incorporate the Seventh Amendment against the states, at least in cases of civil
forfeiture.
B. Forfeiture at Sea: The Palmyra,
Harmony, and Calero-Toledo Trilogy
Two of the cases cited in Bennis-The Palmyra and Harmony--are
among the Court's early cases adopting English in rem forfeiture procedure.
Those cases fall squarely within the traditional domain of civil forfeiture.
In The Palmyra, Justice Story, writing for the Court, upheld a vessel's in
rem forfeiture for piracy, rejecting the argument that the forfeiture was
defective because "the offenders are not alleged to have been convicted upon
any prosecution in personam, of the offence charged in the libel."'47 Story
recognized that "no personal conviction of the offender is necessary to enforce
143. In light of the colonists' bitter denunciation of the deprivation of their right
to a jury in forfeiture actions, see supra text accompanying note 97, the comfort that
Justice Ginsburg took from Michigan styling its proceedings as "equitable," see supra
text accompanying note 42, is simply mystifying.
144. See The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823). On remand in The
Sarah, the jury found for the claimants in an exchequer proceeding. See United States
v. 422 Casks of Wine, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 547, 548 (1828).
145. See Gamharts v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 162, 165 (1872) (where
a seizure giving rise to a forfeiture was made on land, the claimant was entitled to a
jury trial); Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44, 53 (1871) ("Being a
seizure on land, the claimant was entitled to a trial by jury.").
146. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926). The Court had earlier
rejected attempts to incorporate the Seventh Amendment against the states in other
contexts. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875) ("A trial by jury in
suits at common law pending in the State courts is not.., a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States to abridge.").
147. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 12.
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a forfeiture in rem in cases of this nature"'48 because "[t]he thing is here
primarily considered as the offender."' 49  The forfeiture proceeding was
independent of any criminal proceeding, and the challenged statute did not
provide for criminal punishment. 5 ' Story was careful to distinguish,
however, in rem forfeitures in admiralty from common-law in personam
forfeitures. He summarized common law forfeiture:
It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the
party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not,
strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence
of the judgment of conviction. It is plain from this statement, that no right
to the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by
the mere commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the
conviction of the offender. The necessary result was, that in every case
where the crown sought to recover such goods and chattels, it was
indispensable to establish its right by producing the record of the judgment
of conviction.'
But the requirement of a conviction "never was applied to seizures and
forfeitures, created by statute, in rem."'52  Only in personam forfeitures
required the owner's complicity in the wrongdoing.
The Palmyra accords with historical practice. Historically, in rem
forfeiture allowed courts to hear actions against property owned by individuals
beyond the court's in personam jurisdiction. Forfeiture of vessels employed
in wrong-doing carries a sound functional justification with its long historical
pedigree. In rem procedures were essential to enforce revenue and piracy
laws, given that the vessel's owner was likely beyond the court's jurisdiction.
The government often would be left remediless if required to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the owner."
148. Id. at 14.
149. Id.
150. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15. In this the statute also followed tradition.
Piracy was not a crime at early common law. Mears, supra note 100, at 320 n. 3
("Piracy was not a felony at common law . . ."). Forfeiture for piracy was simply a
form of restitution. Id. at 320 ("In the case of piracy, of which suits now became
frequent in the Court of Admiralty, the criminal aspect was disregarded the
proceedings for restitution, and no preliminary conviction was required . . ." ). Piracy
did not become a criminal offense, subject to the loss of lands and chattels, until the
reign of Henry VIII. 4 W.E. FINLASON, REEVES HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 452-53
(reprinted 1981)(1880).
151. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
152. Id. at 14.
153. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The forfeiture of
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The in rem fiction personifying the vessel solves this jurisdictional
dilemma. As Justice Story explained in Harmony, another admiralty in rem
case cited in Bennis: "The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as
the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches,
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner." 4 Justice Story justified the fiction as arising "from the necessity
of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong,
or insuring an indemnity to the injured party."'55 Justice Story made it clear
that the challenged act was no innovation: "The act of Congress has therefore
done nothing more on this point than to affirm and enforce the general
principles of the maritime law and of the law of nations."'5 6 And the rule
did not extend beyond the necessity: "Looking to the authorities upon this
subject, we shall find that the cargo is not generally deemed to be involved in
the same confiscation as the ship, unless the owner thereof co-operates in or
authorizes the unlawful act."'57 Innocence was a defense where feasible.
Chief Justice Rehnquist omitted from his Bennis opinion Justice Story's
explanation of the rule-and limits-of in rem forfeiture.
The most recent case cited by the Chief Justice, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., marked a return to forfeiture's traditional domain. 5 In
Calero-Toledo, the Court upheld a yacht's forfeiture resulting from the
discovery of marijuana on board. The lessor's innocence of the yacht's illegal
use was no defense against forfeiture. 59 The lessor claimed that the
vessels pursuant to the admiralty and maritime law has a long, well-recognized
tradition, evolving as it did from the necessity of finding some source of compensation
for injuries done by a vessel whose responsible owners were often half a world away
and beyond the reach of the law and its processes.").
154. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844).
155. Id. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 55, at 28 ("The ship is the only security
available in dealing with foreigners, and rather than send one's own citizens to search
for a remedy abroad in strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy the
claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to get their indemnity as they may be
able.").
156. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 234 (1844). See also
Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 119 (1856) ("intercourse with the
enemy is sufficient cause for personal punishment, and for the confiscation of property;
that is a cause originating in, and inflexibly enforced by necessity for guarding the
public safety.").
157. Id. at 237. See also The William Bagaley, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 377, 410
(1866) (reporting English cases in which "violation of blockade by the master affects
the ship, but not the cargo, unless it is the property of the same owner, or unless the
owner of the cargo was cognizant of the intended violation.").
158. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
159. See Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (D.P.R.
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forfeiture violated due process and was a taking without just compensation.
The Court offered three reasons for rejecting the lessor's claim to preseizure
notice and hearing: (1) seizure permitted in rem jurisdiction, "thereby
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property
and in enforcing criminal sanctions"; (2) preseizure notice might lead to the
removal, concealment, or destruction of the property; and (3) the seizure was
initiated by government officials rather than "self-interested private
parties."'60 The Court also rejected the takings claim, invoking the long
history of civil and criminal forfeiture provisions, as well as the need to help
enforce the criminal law. Forfeiture ensured that the conveyance would not
be used again for illegal activity "and . . . impos[ed] an economic penalty
thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."'' The owner's innocence
was irrelevant, because the forfeiture would "induc[e] them to exercise greater
care in transferring possession of their property."' 62 The Court did not
explain how the owners might have done so. But in light of civil forfeiture's
roots in admiralty, no explanation was necessary; the forfeiture of the yacht
fell squarely within in rem forfeiture's nautical tradition.
To be sure, in rem procedures were not limited strictly to admiralty; the
customs statutes also authorized the seizure on land of goods that had been
illegally imported. The admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to such
seizures,' but permitting in rem procedures on land for customs violations
comports with the logic of their use in admiralty for the seizure of vessels.
The owner of the goods was often beyond the Court's in personam
jurisdiction, and forfeiture was the government's only means for collecting the
tax.' 65 Moreover, the sanction imposed usually fell within the broad range
1973) ("Plaintiff did not know that its property was being used for an illegal purpose
and was completely innocent of the lessee's criminal act."), rev'd, 416 U.S. 663
(1974).
160. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,679 (1974). On
the economic incentives of government officials who enforce forfeiture laws, see
Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 135.
161. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687.
162. Id. at 688.
163. See, e.g., Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 243 (1846).
164. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76 (1838) ("[I]n cases
purely dependent upon the locality of the act done, it is limited to the sea, and to tide
waters, as far as the tide flows; and that it does not reach beyond high water mark.").
Forfeiture proceedings for goods seized on land were authorized by Congress's "power
to regulate commerce and navigation, and to levy and collect duties." Id. at 78.
165. See HARPER, supra note 83, at 111 (the in rem "technique proved valuable
in customs seizures because the authorities could more often lay their hands upon
smuggled merchandise than upon the smugglers.").
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of the government's expenses incurred due to the smuggling.' 66 Requiring
personal jurisdiction over the owner before smuggled goods could be forfeited
might leave the government without any sanction against the owner. 67 The
government's entitlement to collect taxes by seizing the property could also
be defeated if the goods were removed before judgment: "revenue seizures
. . . are always of personal and movable property."'6 8 Thus, summary
search and seizure of goods imported without payment of duties, accompanied
by streamlined forfeiture procedures, protected the public revenues from
massive fraud.'69 Again, the Chief Justice overlooked this rationale in his
Bennis opinion. He invoked the in rem forfeiture tradition without reference
to its purposes or its limits.
Tina Bennis, however, like most owners of automobiles, was within the
Michigan court's in personam jurisdiction. In light of the historical
justification for civil forfeiture, the Court could have properly adopted a rule
requiring the government to show that the conveyance had crossed a
jurisdictional boundary or that the owner was beyond the court's in personam
jurisdiction before permitting the civil forfeiture of Tina Bennis's car. Recall
that the colonial vice-admiralty courts usually proceeded in personam if the
owner was available. 170 The Court rejected that alternative, instead choosing
to read its tradition as broadly as possible at the expense of an innocent
woman.
166. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S.
232, 237 (1972) ("[The] forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff
regulations. It prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States,
and, by its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for
violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for
investigation and enforcement expenses.").
167. See Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240,246 (1888) ("The person punished
for the offence may be an entirely different person from the owner of the merchandise,
or any person interested in it. The forfeiture of the goods of the principal can form
no part of the personal punishment of his agent.").
168. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 348 (1870). In rem proceedings
also prevented jurisdictional conflicts. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
268, 294 (1870) ("In revenue and admiralty cases a seizure is undoubtedly necessary
to confer upon the court jurisdiction over the thing when proceeding is in rem. In
most such cases the res is movable personal property, capable of actual manucaption.
Unless taken into actual possession by an officer of the court, it might be eloigned
before a decree of condemnation could be made, and thus the decree would be
ineffectual.").
169. See generally In re Platt, 19 F. Cas. 815, 816-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No.
11,212) (Blatchford, J.) (discussing history and policy of customs searches).
170. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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C. Forfeiture Comes Ashore:
Dobbins's Distillery
The next case cited by the Chief Justice, Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, is a sharp departure from forfeiture tradition. The survival of the Civil
War-era Confiscation Acts' encouraged Congress to expand in rem
forfeiture beyond its traditional domain of customs and admiralty to enforce
revenue provisions unrelated to the maritime trade. In so doing, Congress
returned to a royal practice-the Crown's enforcement of the Sugar and Stamp
Acts through in rem procedures-that was so fiercely condemned by the
colonial revolutionaries.' In Dobbins's Distillery, the Court upheld the
forfeiture for liquor-tax violations of a distillery and the real property upon
which it stood. 74 The owner had leased the property to a tenant who
defrauded the government of excise taxes due on the liquor distilled there.'
The Court held it not "necessary that the owner of the property should have
knowledge that the lessee and distiller was committing fraud on the public
revenue, in order that the information of forfeiture should be maintained.' 76
The Court justified its holding by citing The Palmyra 77 No precedent is
cited in Dobbins's Distillery, however, for the proposition that in rem
forfeiture can be applied outside of admiralty and customs proceedings.
In fact, contemporary cases had held to the contrary. Chief Justice Shaw,
in an in rem case for the forfeiture of alcohol, had found the law
unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights:
Supposing the process in rem, when rightly conducted, to be a suitable and
proper mode of enforcing obedience to a useful and salutary law, it does it
by punishing the offender, who must be the owner, or some person intrusted
with the possession by him, or some person for whose unlawful possession
of it the owner is responsible; it does this by depriving such owner of his
property, at the same time preventing the further noxious and unlawful use
of it. Such being the character of the prosecution, in a high degree penal
in its operation and consequences; it should be surrounded with all the
safeguards necessary to the security of the innocent, having the full benefit
171. See Miller, 78 U.S. at 305 (upholding Confiscation Acts as an exercise of
Congress's war powers). On the validity of the Confiscation Acts, see Boudreaux &
Pritchard, supra note 135.
172. See An Act imposing Taxes on distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for other
Purposes, 15 Stat. 125, 133 (July 20, 1868).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101.
174. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
175. Id. at 396-97.
176. Id. at 399.
177. Id. at 399-400.
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of the maxim, that every person shall be presumed innocent until his guilt
be established by proof. He should have notice of the charge of guilty
purpose, upon which his property is declared to be unlawfully held, and in
danger of being forfeited, a time and opportunity to prepare his defence, an
opportunity to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and the benefit
of the legal presumption of innocence.'78
Shaw recognized that the proceeding, although styled in rem, was really
an attempt to punish the owner; therefore, criminal procedures were required.
The Michigan Supreme Court, addressing a similar statute making liquor a
public nuisance, reached the same conclusion in 1856:
That this is clearly a criminal proceeding, within the meaning of the
Constitution, we can entertain no doubt. It is instituted for the purpose of
forfeiting the property, on the ground that is kept for an illegal and criminal
purpose. The party must be tried and convicted of an offence which the
statute declares to be a misdemeanor, before judgment of forfeiture can be
declared, and such forfeiture is imposed as a part of the punishment for
such offence. It makes no difference in its character, that the form of
proceeding for the recovery of the pecuniary penalty or forfeiture, is
assimilated to that of a civil action. The issue is, guilty or not guilty, and
the penalty is imposed as a punishment for an offence.'79
Thus, the state courts of the mid-nineteenth century were vigilant in policing
the boundaries of in rem forfeiture. When those boundaries were breached
they recognized forfeiture as a criminal penalty and struck down efforts to
impose such a penalty through a civil proceeding.8  The Dobbin's
178. Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 35-36 (1854).
179. Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125, 129 (1856). See also Welch v. Stowall, 2
Doug. 332, 341-342 (Mich. 1846) ("So, in the case before us, the nuisance was not
caused by the erection itself, but by the persons who resorted there for the purpose of
prostitution. Our laws have provided a mode by which the cause may be removed; the
person who owned or occupied the house, might have been indicted, as well as the
persons who resorted there for the purpose of prostitution; and, upon conviction, they
would have become tenants of our jails or penitentiary. This would have been striking
at the root of the evil; but surely the destruction of the house did not abate the
nuisance. The cause still remained; its inmates would resort to other receptacles of
vice; and in no respect would the public morals by promoted.").
180. See also Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135, 1146 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (No.
5,764) (Curtis, Cir. J.) (forfeiture of liquor required criminal process); Part of Lot No.
294 v. State, 1 Iowa (Clarke Vol. III) 507, 509 (1855) (action against real property for
trafficking in liquor: "We have no doubt but that this is a criminal proceeding."). But
see State v. Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278, 287 (1856) (upholding in rem forfeiture
of liquor); cf United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 75, 79 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1844) (No.
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Distillery court failed to recognize the criminal nature of the forfeiture at
issue; it instead affirmed the forfeiture despite the owner's lack of wrong-
doing because "the offence ... attached primarily to the distillery."'181
The Court extended the in rem doctrine beyond its historical function in
Dobbins's Distillery. No longer could it be said that "revenue seizures.., are
always of personal and moveable property . . . In Dobbins's, the
jurisdictional rationale that forfeiture was necessary to collect taxes was
unavailable because the taxpayer was subject to the court's in personam
jurisdiction.'83 Moreover, the owner was also subject to in personam
jurisdiction, and therefore would have been subject to injunctive relief to
assure compliance with the law. Nonetheless, the Court extended in rem
forfeiture to real property. The Court did not acknowledge the novelty of the
proceeding, nor did it consider whether the functional justifications for in rem
procedures extended to real property. In fact, the in rem procedure "was
unknown to the common law."'84 Similarly, the Chief Justice in Bennis did
not acknowledge the sharp break with tradition that Dobbins's represented.
Even conceding the correctness of Dobbins's Distillery, its holding offers
scant support for the result in Bennis. When Dobbins leased the property to
his lessee, the distillery was already standing.' Dobbins therefore knew
that there was some risk in entrusting the property to his lessee. His choice
to trust the distillery to the lessee could therefore be analogized to a ship-
owner's choice to entrust his ship to its master. The primary purpose of a
ship is to transport goods; transported goods require the payment of customs
duties. The owner, therefore, must take care in choosing a master who will
15,281) (upholding fine against owner of railroad car in which party carried mail in
violation of federal law protecting postal monopoly; knowledge of owner irrelevant).
181. Dobbin's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877).
182. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331, 348 (1870).
183. Moreover, the government could levy, by summary procedure, on any
property owned by the taxpayer to the extent of the tax. See Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 273, 276-80 (1855) (holding
that summary seizure of real property for payment of taxes owing did not violate due
process, because such procedures were followed in both England and the colonies
before the Revolution). See also G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338,
352 (1977) (no Fourth Amendment violation in summary seizure of automobiles to
satisfy tax claims); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) ("The right of
the United States to collect its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings
has long been settled."); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (no due
process violation in distraint and sale of real and personal property for satisfaction of
unpaid taxes).
184. UBBELOHDE, supra note 91, at 20.
185. Compare United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) (no forfeiture of
mortgatee's interest where he had no knowledge of still's presence on real property).
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ensure the payment of the requisite duty. 8 6  By simple measures, the
carefully chosen master could avoid all risk of forfeiture.'87 Where the
master could not avoid the risk, the Court rejected the forfeiture.'88
So, too, with the distillery. The distillery's sole purpose is the production
of alcohol. Congress adopted a comprehensive system of regulation and
186. See Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110, 119 (1856) ("it is a
settled principle, that if the owners had not anticipated a violation of the public law,
the fate of their vessel, with respect to an infraction of that law, must depend upon the
conduct of the agent with whom they have entrusted its management."); United States
v. Hutchinson, 26 F. Cas. 446, 449 (D.C. Me. 1868) (No. 15,431) ("It thus appears
that in such a case an innocent owner is made to lose his property, his vessel, by
reason of its misuse and illegal employment by his agents in charge. It is after all,
holding the owner responsible through a forfeiture of his property for the misconduct
of his servants and agents.").
187. Hutchinson, 26 F. Cas. at 449 ("there can be no doubt that it was not an
impossibility for the master to obtain accurate knowledge of all goods on board his
vessel and enter the same on his manifest, and by so doing, of course, escape the
penalty for those which were not thus entered."); Id, at 450 ("Certainly is not exacting
much of a master to have such care and oversight of this ship and cargo, as to prevent
goods from leaving her before the duties are paid thereon. A very little extra time, a
few more fastenings, could easily prevent anything of this sort.").
A similar understanding is reflected in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion on circuit
in United States v. The Little Charles:
This is not a proceeding against the owner; it is a proceeding against the
vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel, which is not less an offence,
and does not the less subject her to forfeiture, because it was committed
without the authority, and against the will of the owner. It is true, that
inanimate matter can commit no offence. The mere wood, iron, and sails
of the ship, cannot, of themselves, violate the law. But this body is
animated and put in action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The
vessel acts and speaks by the master. She reports herself by the master.
It is, therefore, not unreasonable, that the vessel should be affected by this
report.
26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612). The owner's liability without
fault resulted from the negligent omissions of his master. Id. ("The master is selected
by the owner, as his agent, for the purpose, among others, of reporting the vessel on
her coming into port."). Note that Chief Justice Marshall was careful to distinguish
in personam actions from the in rem action before him. Id. ("If this was a prosecution
against the owner personally ... the argument [that the owner could not be charged
with the actions of the master] would be entitled to great consideration.").
188. See Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 347, 363 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.)
(rejecting forfeiture of goods illegally imported after shipwreck: "it is unquestionably
a correct legal principle, that a forfeiture can only be applied to those cases in which
the means that are prescribed for the prevention of a forfeiture may be employed.").
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monitoring for distilleries in response to widespread evasion of the liquor
tax."" In light of this comprehensive system of regulation, the owner
entrusting his distillery to another must take care to choose a lessee who will
ensure that the liquor taxes are paid. This argument, while not made by the
Dobbin's Distillery Court, at least brings the forfeiture in that case into the
proximity of the forfeiture tradition.
No such analogy, however, fits Tina Bennis's case. The primary purpose
of an automobile is, of course, transportation. Tina Bennis had no reason to
suspect that her husband would use that parked car as a shelter for criminal
activity."9 As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent,
the forfeited property bore no necessary connection to the offense
committed by petitioner's husband. It is true that the act occurred in the
car, but it might just as well have occurred in a multitude of other
locations. The mobile character of the car played a part only in the
negotiation, but not in the consummation of the offense.'9'
Tina Bennis reasonably believed that her husband used the car only for the
purpose for which she had entrusted him with the vehicle: driving to and
from work." The car's primary purpose does nothing to put its owner on
notice that she must take care in selecting an agent to whom she entrusts her
property. And, of course, the idea of taking care in selecting an agent
translates poorly from the businesses of shipping and distilling to the context
of marriage. The analogy to the owner's selection of his master is strained to
the breaking point by imposing such duties on individuals who are selecting
spouses. All of the cases cited by the Chief Justice involved commercial
relationships; none of those cases dealt with a personal relationship such as
marriage.
189. United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 157 (E.D. Wis. 1875)
(No. 16,515).
190. See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965)
("There is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile.").
191. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1006 (1996).
192. Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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D. Forfeiture on "Dry" Land:
J. W. Goldsmith and Van Oster
Prohibition brought forfeiture into common use in the United States.'93
The National Prohibition Act provided for forfeiture of automobiles used to
transport alcohol, but it also provided a defense for innocent owners. 94 In
passing the National Prohibition Act, however, Congress did not repeal the
Internal Revenue Act's provisions authorizing the forfeiture of conveyances
used to transport untaxed liquor.' 5 The Internal Revenue Act provided no
defense for innocent owners. 96 Not surprisingly, federal prosecutors
preferred to bring forfeitures under the Revenue Act.
In J. W. Goldsmith, an innocent third-party claimant, who lost his security
interest in a car forfeited for transporting alcohol, broadly challenged in rem
forfeiture under the Internal Revenue Act. 97 The Court rejected his due
process claim, relying on Congress's determination that in rem forfeiture was
necessary to protect the revenue:
Congress must have taken into account the necessities of the Government,
its revenues and policies, and was faced with the necessity of making
provision against their violation or evasion and the ways and means of
violation or evasion. In breaches of revenue provisions some forms of
property are facilities, and therefore it may be said, that Congress interposes
the care and responsibility of their owners in aid of the prohibitions of the
law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property a certain
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong.'9'
The Court did not scrutinize the purported "necessity" of in rem forfeiture
to enforce the revenue laws on dry land, as opposed to revenue laws that
applied to goods shipped in and out of the country. The "necessity" of in rem
193. Roy W. McDonald, Automobile Forfeitures and the Eighteenth Amendment,
10 TEX. L. REV. 140, 142 (1932) ("while forfeitures are thus older than written law
and have featured our revenue legislation from its earliest days, only recently did they
attain importance for the general practitioner.").
194. Id. at 143.
195. United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321, 326-27, 332 (1926).
196. Id. at 332.
197. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 506, 509
(1921). The proceeding was brought pursuant to "a libel ... filed against a Hudson
automobile of the appraised value of $800." Id. at 508.
198. Id. at 510. After Prohibition's repeal, the Court stepped back from the rather
daunting monitoring duties it had imposed on creditors. See United States v. One 1936
Model Ford V-8 De Luxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 236 (1939) ("The forfeiture acts...
were intended for protection of the revenues, not to punish without fault.").
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forfeiture for enforcing the revenue laws was hardly obvious: there was "no
way in which the tax could be... paid. . ."' Ignoring this difficulty, the
Court simply drew an "analogy to the law of deodand,2 "2° and cited to
Dobbin's Distillery as authority for the Act's constitutionality."' Having
sanctioned the unrestricted use of in rem forfeiture as a device for collecting
taxes in Dobbin's Distillery, the Court again upheld in rem forfeiture as
necessary for the collection of taxes. Once again the Court did not analyze
whether the in rem rationale properly applied beyond the admiralty jurisdiction
and the customs laws to taxes that incurred on dry land. But Congress had no
intention of collecting the taxes in J. W. Goldsmith. Whatever Congress's
original intent had been in passing the Revenue Act's forfeiture provisions, the
federal government's continuing use of forfeiture against innocents during
Prohibition was plainly punitive. The J. W. Goldsmith Court simply ignored
this punitive intent in relying on Dobbins's Distillery.
The Court also rejected the argument that its prior cases had turned on
the connection between the nature of the property and the forfeitable offense.
There is an intimation that in the prior cases there was something in the
relation of the parties to the property or its uses from which it was possible
to infer its destination to an illegal purpose; at any rate, the risk of such
purpose and that such relation had influence in the decision of the cases.We
are unable to accept the intimation. There may, indeed, be greater risk to
the owner of property in one form or purpose of its bailment than in
another, but wrong cannot be imputed to him by reason of the form of
purpose. It is the illegal use that is the material consideration, it is that
which works the forfeiture, the guilt or innocence of its owner being
accidental. If we should regard simply the adaptability of a particular form
of property to an illegal purpose, we should have to ascribe facility to an
automobile as an aid to the violation of the law. It is a "thing" that can be
used in the removal of "goods and commodities" and the law is explicit in
its condemnation of such things.22
In rem procedures were no longer rooted in the jurisdictional necessities of the
admiralty jurisdiction and customs enforcement. In the Court's view, strict
liability attached to any property used in criminal activity. The automobile,
because of its flexibility, was useful for a variety of illegal purposes. The
199. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. at 327.
200. J. W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 510 (emphasis supplied). Deodand, of course,
was never accepted as part of American law. See supra note 66. Moreover, deodand
was forfeited in criminal proceedings. See supra note 62.
201. J. W. Goldsmith, 254 U.S. at 511.
202. Id. at 512-13 (emphasis supplied).
[Vol. 61
36
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/3
THE FORFEITURE TRADITION
Court made it plain that it would read in rem forfeiture as broadly as possible
to serve Congress's purposes.
The final step came five years later in Van Oster v. Kansas."3 Having
allowed the federal government to impose a punitive in rem forfeiture on an
innocent party in J. W. Goldsmith, the Court saw no reason to restrain the State
of Kansas from doing the same. Kansas made no pretense that it was
enforcing revenue laws through in rem forfeiture; it was simply trying to
suppress the illegal trade in liquor. The Court had no objection:
We do not perceive any valid distinction between the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the exercise of the police power of a state in this
particular field and the application of the Fifth Amendment to the similar
exercise of the taxing power by the federal government, or any reason for
holding that the one is not as plenary as the other.2°
Thus, the Court allowed in rem forfeiture to evolve from its origins in
admiralty and customs enforcement to become a general tool for government
to suppress criminal activity through civil procedures. More to the point,
government was permitted to wield that weapon against people who had
committed no crime.
J. W. Goldsmith and Van Oster, having taken in rem forfeiture far beyond
its traditional domain, arguably support the Chief Justice's conclusion in
Bennis. But those cases hardly represent the "long and unbroken line of
cases" claimed by the Chief Justice. They are plainly distinguishable from
The Palmyra, Harmony, and Calero-Toledo, all of which fell within the
traditional domain of in rem forfeiture: offenses related to the sea. Even
Dobbins's Distillery, which represented a break from that nautical tradition,
at least had a connection with tax collection, in rem forfeiture's original
purpose. J. W. Goldsmith and Van Oster had no connection whatsoever to in
rem forfeiture's tradition. Thus, the "tradition" that the Chief Justice relied on
203. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
204. Id. at 468. The Court had previously approved a state's use of in rem
forfeiture in connection with a maritime offense. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 71, 75-76 (1855) (Curtis, J.) ("it is the judgment of the court, that it is within
the legislative power of the State to interrupt the voyage and inflict the forfeiture of
a vessel . . . for a disobedience, by those on board, of the commands of [a law
proscribing oystering]. To inflict a forfeiture of a vessel on account of the misconduct
of those on board-treating the thing as liable to forfeiture, because the instrument of
the offense is within established principles of legislation, which have been applied by
most civilized governments. Our opinion is, that so much of this law as appears by
the record to have been applied to this case by the court below, is not repugnant to the
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in Bennis amounts to Prohibition-era cases in which the Court allowed civil
liberties to be trampled in the fight against demon rum. That so-called
tradition arose long after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The common law tradition of in rem forfeiture was firmly
rooted in admiralty until after the Civil War. Only historical
revisionism-blind to in rem forfeiture's purpose in solving the jurisdictional
dilemma faced by the admiralty courts--can tie the forfeitures in J. W.
Goldsmith and Van Oster to the common law tradition of forfeiture. The stare
decisis effect of Van Oster may justify the result in Bennis, but tradition
surely does not. Stare decisis, according to the Chief Justice, is "a principle
of policy," not an "inexorable command.""0 5 "[W]hen governing decisions
are unworkable or are badly reasoned, th[e] Court has never felt constrained
to follow precedent.2 0 6  For the reasons discussed, Van Oster surely
qualifies as "badly reasoned."
But, even conceding the validity of Van Oster, the forfeiture of Tina
Bennis's interest in the car cannot be justified. Van Oster, like the other five
cases cited by the Chief Justice, was an in rem proceeding.0 7  In rem
proceedings never protected the rights of innocent owners.0 3 In personam
proceedings, by contrast, protected most ownership interests held by third
parties at English common law;2" American in personam forfeiture
protected all interests held by innocent third parties.2"0  Tina Bennis was
deprived of her interest in an in personam proceeding. In Michael H. v.
Gerald D., Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, wrote that the proper
focus for due process inquiry is "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified., 21 2 Applying this standard to Tina Bennis's case, the relevant
205. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1127 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (citations omitted).
206. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). This doctrine is "particularly
true in constitutional cases, because in such cases correction through legislative action
is practically impossible." Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
207. State v. Brown, 119 Kan. 874, 874 (1925) ("Stella Van Oster intervened and
asked to be made a party to the proceeding against the automobile. .. "), aff'd, 272
U.S. 465 (1926).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 62.
209. See supra text accompanying note 108.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 133.
211. See MiCH. COMP. LAW. ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996) ("Any person
or his or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any
building vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section
is guilty of a nuisance.").
212. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
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historical tradition was the treatment of innocent ownership interests in in
personam proceedings. As we discussed above, that tradition would have
protected Tina Bennis's ownership interest. 23 The Chief Justice ignored
that tradition in Bennis.
Moreover, in personam forfeiture never resulted from convictions for
misdemeanors.24 At common law, even John Bennis's interest in the car
would not have been forfeitable, much less Tina Bennis's interest.
215
Michigan's extension of forfeiture to non-felonies has no basis in the common
law. Given the punitive nature of the forfeiture, Michigan should have been
required to seek the forfeiture in a criminal, rather than civil, proceeding.
Tina Bennis's interest would have been protected in a criminal proceeding.
IV. FORFEITING INNOCENCE: BENNIS V. MICHIGAN
Justice Thomas correctly notes in his Bennis concurrence that legal
precedent and history can save otherwise objectionable practices from
constitutional condemnation. Tradition is a powerful tool of constitutional
interpretation. But those who would rely on tradition must read tradition
carefully. For the many reasons detailed above, the Anglo-American history
of forfeiture bears scant resemblance to the history recounted by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his Bennis opinion.
Bad history is especially disappointing coming from the Rehnquist Court,
which is ostensibly committed to judicial restraint and legal tradition.
Opinions relying on tradition as a method of constitutional interpretation
should be models of painstaking and meticulous historical understanding.
Slipshod history makes reliance on legal tradition suspect. While a strong
case can be made that long-standing legal rules and practices generally
embody a quantum of wisdom that even the most intelligent courts are
unlikely to possess,216 a Court that fabricates its history, or refuses to learn
the traditions it purports to apply, does not really rely upon legal tradition.
History, done poorly, is merely a cloak for the Court's own policy
preferences. Only faithful reliance on history gives a basis for decision
making external to the judges' policy views. A Court that relies on sham
history is as guilty of judicial activism as the Warren Court, a court that
explicitly sought to further "justice" without regard to constitutional text or
213. See supra text accompanying notes 133.
214. See supra note 70.
215. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 70, at 64 ("open and notorious lewdness...
by... some grossly scandalous and public indecency, for which the punishment is by
fine and imprisonment.").
216. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, Individualism: True and False, in INDIVIDUALISM
AND ECONOMIC ORDER (F.A. Hayek, ed.) (1948).
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precedent. The only difference, apart from their particular policy preferences,
is the candor of the respective courts.
Forfeiture is a well-established feature of Anglo-American legal history.
That history, however, is marked by nuances and limitations on government's
forfeiture powers ignored by the Bennis majority. To ignore these nuances
and limitations not only led to the wrong result in Bennis, but more generally
undermines the rule of law. After all, a Court that mischaracterizes legal
tradition to achieve a desired outcome is no less activist than the Warren
Court. Warren Court decisions, of course, have been a prime target of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and like-minded proponents of judicial restraint. The Chief
Justice and the Bennis majority have set back the cause of legal tradition and
judicial restraint by their sloppy use of history. True respect for tradition
requires a fidelity to that tradition, wherever it may lead. The Bennis opinion
falls disappointingly short of that standard. Unfortunately, Tina Bennis must
pay the hard price of the Rehnquist Court's bad history.
40
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/3
